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Introduction 
 
The present report is the result of a Delphi study carried out between September 2006 and January 
2007 as part of the work by WP8 of the EU-funded SARSControl project. The aim of the Delphi 
study was to gather expert opinions on different policy issues concerning infectious disease 
management. These expert opinions and arguments will, along with research findings of other work 
packages of the SARSControl project, be part of the foundation for the development of international 
policy recommendations against SARS and SARS-like diseases, as the overall aim of WP8.  
 
The Delphi study included 2 written Delphi rounds which were followed by a face-to-face group 
meeting The Delphi panel included experts from 22 different countries with expertise in the field of 
infectious diseases. The study was carried out over a period of 9 months.  
 
The following report discusses the Delphi method, its application in the SARSControl Delphi study 
and its results. 
    
1. Delphi method 
1.1. General description of the Delphi Method 
The Delphi method is an effective and reliable data collection method that is particularly useful 
when there is little knowledge or uncertainty surrounding the area being investigated (Dalkey & 
Helmer, 1963, Reid et al. 1990, McKenna 1994, Crisp et al.1997). It was originally developed by 
the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and was applied to assess the direction of long range trends, 
with emphasis on science and technology and their effects on society; to forecast likely inventions, 
new technologies and the social and economic impact of technological change. Nowadays the 
method is becoming increasingly popular in health and social research. 
 
The Delphi is defined as “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the 
process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole to deal with a complex problem.” 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975). It is based on the premise that ‘pooled intelligences’ enhances individual 
judgment and captures the collective opinions of experts (Linstone & Turoff 1975, Moore 1987, 
Murry & Hammons 1995, Jones et al. 2000). 
 
There are several types of Delphi and the following is a classification by Van Zoligen & Klaassen, 
(2003). 
 
The Classical Delphi (a forum for establishing facts): It is a type of Delphi where data are collected 
from the participants in a series of rounds and the results are fed back to the participants until 
stability in responses among the participants has been achieved. The main aim of this Delphi is to 
reach consensus keeping in mind anonymity, through iteration. 
 
The Policy Delphi (a forum for generating ideas): The policy Delphi is mainly used in social and 
political issues and is suitable for application in the social sciences. The aim of policy Delphi is not 
to reach stability (consensus) in response but generate policy alternatives. Here the Delphi is used as 
an instrument for policy development and promoting participation. 
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The Decision Delphi (a forum for making decisions): Decision Delphis are used for decision 
making on social developments. In this type of Delphi it is crucial that all decision makers involved 
in the problem participate. They are selected according to their position in the hierarchy of decision 
makers. The aim is to structure thinking so that consensus can be achieved. 
 
The Group Delphi (a face-to-face meeting): This type of Delphi differs from the classical Delphi 
only on the point of anonymity. 
 
         Steps of a classical Delphi: 
    
                                                         
The starting point for the application of the Delphi method is to identify the problem and then select 
experts (Delphi panel) based on the expertise required for the problem defined. A questionnaire is 
developed and distributed to the panel members. The data are collected and analysed for consensus 
in responses (consensus is defined in before hand). If the responses have reached consensus a report 
is developed based on them, if not, a new questionnaire is developed based on the results of the 
previous round and fed back to the panel. This process is repeated until consensus is reached based 
on which a final report is developed. 
 
Other forms of the Delphi such as the policy, decision and group Delphi are variations of the classic 
Delphi. There are many more different forms of Delphi now in existence known as ‘modified 
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Delphi’ (McKenna, 1994) as researchers modify it to suit their needs and few researchers now use 
uniform methods. 
 
Some advantages of the Delphi method are that it gives the freedom to select participants 
geographically far away from each other and guarantees anonymity. The method is also considered 
quick (Everett 1993), cheap and cost-efficient (Jones et al.1992, Davidson et al. 1997) and is a 
relatively efficient way to combine the knowledge and abilities of a group of experts (Lindeman, 
1975). 
 
1.2. The SARSControl Delphi method 
The goal of the SARSControl project is to develop effective and acceptable strategies for the 
control of SARS and new emerging infections in China and Europe, and the Delphi method has 
been selected as one of several approaches to help to achieve this goal. The SARSControl Delphi 
study uses the policy Delphi method described above and consists of 2 written rounds and a final 
face to face group meeting. 
 
Aim of the Delphi survey 
The aim of the SARSControl Delphi study is to gather expert opinion on a variety of national and 
international health policies against SARS and SARS-like diseases.  
 
Selection of Delphi panel 
For the study it was determined to have experts in the field of infectious disease management. The 
selection of experts was done in cooperation with the National Institute of Public Health and 
Environment (RIVM), The Netherlands. The collaboration with RIVM research group was agreed 
upon as they were carrying out a similar Delphi study aimed in development and appraisal of 
scientific advice on outbreak control measures. The main reason for the collaboration was to avoid 
addressing the same experts separately by the RIVM research group and by WP8 of the 
SARSControl project. It was considered to make it easier to work together in selection of experts 
and distribution of questionnaires to achieve a higher response rate. A total of 60 infectious disease 
experts were invited to participate as their countries national expert and 47 accepted the invitation.  
 
Response rate 
Round 1: 38 experts from 22 countries responded out of the 47 who were sent an invitation (80 % 
response rate).  
Round 2: The round 2 questionnaire was sent to the 38 experts who had responded to the first 
round, out of which 28 experts from 18 countries responded (74 % response rate). 
 
Country representation in round 1 & 2 of the SARSControl Delphi Survey 
 Country Representation 
(Round 1) 
Representation 
(Round 2) 
1. Austria 1 1 
2. Belgium 1 - 
3. Czech Republic 2 2 
4. Denmark 2 2 
5. Estonia 1 1 
6. France 1 1 
7. Germany 3 3 
8. Ireland 1 - 
9. Latvia 1 - 
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10. Lithuania 1 1 
11. Luxembourg 1 1 
12. Malta 1 1 
13. Netherlands 4 3 
14. Norway 1 1 
15. Poland 1 1 
16. Portugal 3 2 
17. Singapore 1 1 
18. Slovakia 2 1 
19. Slovenia 2 2 
20. Spain 2 1 
21. Sweden 2 2 
22. United Kingdom 4 1 
Total 38 28 
 
1.3. Questionnaire design and the Delphi rounds 
The first questionnaire was prepared based on the problem areas in the international infection 
disease control as found in the literature review, the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP), an analysis carried out as a part of WP8 work (Deliverable No 8.3), and input from the 
SARSControl WP leaders. A 9-point Likert agreement scale was used to measure the strength of a 
subject's agreement with a clear statement (1 being completely disagree and 9 being completely 
agree). 
 
Completely disagree Do not agree/nor disagree Completely agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
The first questionnaire was structured around the 13 policy issues listed below for management of 
SARS and SARS-like diseases.  
 
Policy issues selected for the Delphi: 
• National pandemic plans 
• Surveillance indicators 
• Laboratory capacities 
• Triage policies 
• Roles and responsibilities of central 
and regional levels 
• Cooperation between neighbouring 
countries 
• Antiviral drugs 
• Vaccine strategies 
• Impact on healthcare systems 
• Maintenance of essential services 
• Non-medical interventions 
• Communication strategies 
• Travel policies 
 
In order to also consider the time line in an outbreak situation, the questions were divided into 3 
periods: the inter-pandemic period, the pandemic alert period and the pandemic period as defined 
by the W.H.O. for influenza (www.who.int).  
 
The 1st questionnaire consisted of a total of 137 questions (appendix 1): 130 agreement statements, 
5 open–ended questions and 2 questions where the respondents had to use drop down boxes. The 
2nd round questionnaire (appendix 2) consisted of a total of 65 questions: 58 agreement statements, 
5 questions with drop down boxes and 2 open ended questions. 
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The questionnaires were designed using the software ‘Microsoft Word’. They were provided with a 
tick box like the following   for the respondents to fill out their replies for each statement. Both 
questionnaires where provided with comment boxes after each policy issue. The comments along 
with the statistical results were used to formulate the 2nd questionnaire and the latter was fed back to 
the respondents as summaries. As the aim of the SARSControl project is to focus on “SARS and 
new emerging infections” the 1st questionnaire was designed to cover policy issues related to both 
SARS and pandemic influenza. However, this dual target turned out to cause confusion and 
misunderstandings due to partly lack of clear distinction between the pandemic diseases in all the 
questions. For this reason general questions on pandemic diseases were deleted in round 2 and focus 
was put on specific diseases (SARS and pandemic influenza). Statements that reached consensus 
were not included in the second round of the Delphi, but some where used to formulate new 
questions to get additional information. 
 
Pilot round: The round one questionnaire was sent to 3 experts (not belonging to the written Delphi 
panel) and all the SARSControl WP leaders for pilot testing. Changes were made based on the 
comments and suggestions received. 
  
Distribution of the 1st questionnaire: The distribution and collection of the questionnaire to the 
experts was done by RIVM via Email (some replies where received as paper format from the 
respondents by mail) 
 
Analysis of the 1st questionnaire: The analysis of the replies to round 1 was done by looking at the 
statistical using SPSS and qualitative data provided by the respondents. The replies were grouped 
into 3 brackets (1 to 3 completely disagree, 4 to 6 nor agree/nor disagree and 7 to 9 completely 
agree). Consensus was defined if 75 % or more of the responses fell in one of the 3 brackets.  
 
Preparation of the 2nd written round: The questionnaire for the second round was based on the 
results and comments of the participants in the first round. Questions which had reached consensus 
were not included, however, some new questions raised by the respondents were asked. The 
respondents comments were also used to formulate questions and questions which caused confusion 
where rephrased or deleted. 
 
Analysis of the 2nd questionnaire: Analysis of the second round was done in the same way as the 
first. 
 
Group meeting: A group meeting was organized with 11 Experts, who did not belong to the written 
Delphi panel. The experts were presented with the results of the first two Delphi rounds and asked 
to discuss/share their opinions on the non-consensus issues identified as well as answers from the 
open ended questions from the two written rounds. 
 
1.4. Timeline of the SARSControl Delphi study 
Date Event 
7th July 2006 Request for input for Delphi rounds from WP leaders 
18th August 2006 Request for comments on draft questionnaire sent to all WP leaders 
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20th September 2006 Invitation letter sent out  to participate in the Delphi  (n=60) 
29th September 2006 Reminder to reply to invitation sent out  
4th October 2006 Distribution of round 1 questionnaires +cover letter to the Delphi 
panel (47 experts accepted)  
18th October 2006 First reminder sent out  to those who didn’t reply 
27th October 2006 Second reminder sent out to those who didn’t reply 
3rd November 2006 Third reminder sent out 
3rd November -11th 
December 2006 
Analysis of round 1 results and formulation of new questionnaire 
(dataset n=38) 
12th January 2007 Distribution of round 2 questionnaires (n=38)     
3rd January 2007 First reminder sent out 
15th January 2007 Second reminder sent out 
3- 24th January 2007 Analysis of round 2 results and preparation for Delphi meeting  
30th January 2007 Delphi face to face meeting 
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2. Results of the SARSControl written Delphi rounds 
 
In the following section, consensus results of the two written Delphi rounds along with the 
qualitative comments will be presented. Please find a copy of the 1st questionnaire in Appendix 1 
and the 2nd questionnaire in appendix 2. A detailed report of the statistical distribution of the 
consensus and non-consensus replies can be found in appendix 3 and 4. The structure of the 
presentation below will follow the policy issues included in the written questionnaires and each will 
be concluded with a short summary (grey) box: 
 
1. National pandemic plans 
2. Surveillance indicators 
3. Laboratory capacities 
4. Triage policies 
5. Roles and responsibilities of central and 
regional levels 
6. Cooperation between neighbouring countries 
7. Impact on healthcare systems 
8. Maintenance of essential services 
9. Non-medical interventions 
10. Communication strategies 
11. Travel policies 
  
2.1. Pandemic preparedness plans (PPP) 
95% of the Delphi panel stated their country has an operational national PPP specifically for 
pandemic influenza whereas only 54% stated to have the same for SARS. 1/3 of the panel claimed 
to have a common pandemic preparedness and response plan for diseases with pandemic potential.  
 
A majority of 95% of the Delphi panel agreed on the necessity of testing national and local plans in 
order to put them into practice.  71% entered a time interval between 1-3 years for testing national 
plans, and 71% entered a time interval between ½-3 years for local plans.  
 
93% of the panel agreed that plans should be tested based on disease and level of threat, or as stated 
by one of the panelists: 
 
“Testing of plans has a specific objective for the threat to which a plan applies, but other threats 
will also benefit from each test of preparedness plans as a result of the more generic aspects in the 
testing. So I can imagine that testing SARS and influenza pandemia plans could be planned not too 
closely together, but alternating every x years, for example: t=0: SARS t=2,5 years: flu; t=5 yrs: 
SARS etc”.  
 
86% agreed on the need for joint exercises between neighbouring countries, however, as stated by 
one of the panelists, the need might vary:  
 
“The need for cross-border exercises is likely to vary by the degree in which  (a) medical services 
are accessible to citizens of a neighbouring country (b) the differences in the level of preparedness 
between neighbouring countries, (c) trans-border commutes of the work force.” 
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96% agreed that countries should have a plan to describe the process by which individuals belonging to 
priority groups will be identified, and the list below represents the most frequently mentioned groups: 
 
• Health care officials  
• Politicians/Policy makers 
• Public health officials 
• Border staff 
• Staff on public transport 
• Media  
• Travellers 
• Emergency personnel  
• Chinese communities 
• Police 
• Civil servants with public 
duties of civic organization  
• Army 
 
 
 
2.2. Surveillance indicators 
Surveillance is regarded as one of the most important components in infectious disease management 
policies (ECDC-2003) to enable early detection/report of cases by way of international, national and 
inter-sector collaboration on monitoring emerging new infectious diseases. The questions on 
surveillance indicators were asked for general diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS and 
Avian influenza), and not specifically for SARS.     
 
87% of the experts agreed on the need for clear guidance on surveillance and monitoring of key 
indicators (e.g. antiviral testing and health care response system) in the different pandemic phases in 
order to enable the healthcare system to cope during a pandemic period. 87% also agreed to the 
statement that a joint operational surveillance and outbreak procedure for pandemic diseases 
between health and veterinary authorities will enable early detection of an emerging new infection.  
 
   
2.3. Laboratory capacities 
A vast majority (95%) agreed that anticipated needs in terms of laboratory supplies and staffing 
should be measured in order to enable prioritization (of cases) for lab testing during the different 
phases of a pandemic.  
 
Summary of pandemic preparedness plans: 
The need for an operational national Pandemic Preparedness Plan (PPP) is agreed upon by a 
majority of the experts as well as testing of plans on a local, national as well as transnational level. 
The suggested time interval for testing PPP was between ½-3 years, and 12 priority groups were 
listed, for which countries should have a plan to identify them during an outbreak of SARS.  
Summary of Surveillance indicators: 
The experts agree on the need to have guidance on surveillance and monitoring of key indicators 
such as healthcare system and surveillance collaboration between health and veterinary authorities, 
bearing in mind, however, that a disease with pandemic potential may not be of zoonotic origin like 
e.g. HIV and TB.   
Summary of laboratory capacities: 
Anticipated needs of laboratory supplies and staffing are necessary to enable prioritization of cases 
during the different pandemic phases.   
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2.4. Triage policy 
89% agreed that triage priorities need to be clearly organized to avoid inefficiencies in the response to the 
pandemic along with ethical dilemmas; therefore national pandemic preparedness plans must include a 
detailed triage plan including mechanisms such as telephone hotlines, special care centers etc. to detect and 
classify patients.  
 
Comments from several of the panel members state that triage policies should not be too detailed and they 
should be formulated in a way such that they can be adapted based on the epidemiology of the pandemic.  
 
 
2.5. Roles and responsibilities 
97% of the panel agreed that the distribution of roles and responsibilities at national and 
local/regional levels need to be clearly defined in the national pandemic plan. 87% also agreed that 
there is a need for the national level to monitor the development and completion of local and 
regional plans.  
 
 
2.6. Cooperation between direct neighbouring countries 
84% agreed that countries should to be informed of the pandemic plans of direct neighbouring 
countries, in order to enable collaboration in case of an outbreak (e.g. travel restrictions, clinical 
care and health service plans). The qualitative comments indicate this to be particularly important 
for small countries.     
 
 
 
Summary of Triage policy: 
National pandemic preparedness plans must include a detailed triage plan including mechanisms such as 
telephone hotlines, special care centres etc. to detect and classify patients. However, the plan needs to be 
flexible as details depend on the type of pandemic we are facing.  
Summary of roles and responsibilities: 
Roles and responsibilities of the national and local/regional levels needs to be clearly defined in the 
national PPP and the development of local and regional plans need to monitored on the national 
level.  
Summary of cooperation between direct neighbouring countries: 
Countries should be informed of the pandemic plans of their direct neighbours in order to enable 
collaboration on outbreak strategies concerning e.g. travel and health care.  
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2.7. Impact on health care systems  
During an epidemic the health care systems will be confronted with different challenges (such as shortage of 
human resources, infection control methods, scarcity of health care facilities). The panel was asked to list up 
to 5 challenges relevant for their country and the list below represents the most recurrently mentioned 
challenges: 
• Shortage of human resources (primary healthcare and hospital care personnel etc.) 
• Scarcity of health care facilities, e.g. hospital beds. 
• Mechanism for assessment of the provision of drugs 
• Capacity building in crisis management 
• Ethical obligations to work despite threat to own health 
• Drug supply (antivirals, vaccinces etc.) 
• Ethical obligations to work despite threat to own health 
• Shortage of money 
• Lack of adequate communication towards the general public and towards the HCW 
• Case management and infection control capacity 
 
 
2.8. Maintenance of essential services 
95% of the panel agreed that plans for the maintenance of essential services (e.g. supply of food, 
transportation, communication etc.) during a pandemic are needed.  
The listing below represents the most frequently listed sectors that the panelists found to be relevant 
for their country to be involved in preparing for maintenance of essential services during an 
outbreak: 
 
• Communication 
• Transports (of public and goods)  
• Food distribution 
• Basic public services (gas, water, 
electricity) 
• Police 
• Army 
• Fire brigade 
• Garbage disposal services  
• Emergency decision makers 
• Health care sector 
• Civil protection 
• Law enforcement institutions 
 
Summary of maintenance of essential services: 
There is a need for plans on the maintenance of essential services, such as e.g. 
food/water/gas/electricity/police/fire brigade during a pandemic.  
Summary of impact of health care systems: 
The health care systems around the world will be confronted with different challenges during an 
epidemic, such as e.g. scarcity of facilities, human resources, supplies and management capacities, 
which needs to be accounted for in the pre-pandemic period.    
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2.9. Non-medical public interventions 
The panel was asked to indicate to what extend they agreed with a number of non-medical 
interventions being efficient, applicable, politically acceptable and cost-effective to control a SARS 
outbreak. A scenario was given: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country.  
 
Contact tracing was agreed upon to be an efficient intervention by 81%, applicable by 89%, 
politically acceptable by 87%, and cost-effective by 76% of the respondents. Use of face masks was 
agreed upon by 96% to be an efficient intervention to control SARS, by 89% to be applicable, by 
92% to be politically acceptable and 75% to be cost-effective. 
 
 
 
2.10. Communication strategies 
81% disagreed that during a pandemic period it is better to delay announcement of information in 
order to avoid public panic and distress, however 75% agreed that information about suspected or 
probable cases of diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS) should be confirmed before a 
public announcement. The statement, that correcting rumours and inaccurate information in the 
media or in the public should be a communication priority during an epidemic, was agreed by 89%. 
78% agreed that there is a need to identify population sub-groups and provide targeted 
communication channels specific for these groups in the pandemic period. The list below represents 
the groups most frequently listed by the panel members: 
 
• Health care officials 
• Public health officials 
• Staff of public transport 
• Travellers 
• Chinese communities 
• Civil servants with public duties of 
civic organization 
• Politicians/Policy makers 
• Boarder staff 
• Media 
• Emergency personnel 
• Police 
• Army 
 
Summary of non-medical public health interventions: 
Contact tracing and use of facemasks by healthcare workers are perceived to be efficient, 
applicable, politically acceptable and cost-effective community interventions to control a SARS 
outbreak.  
Summary of Communication: 
It is better not to delay announcement of information to the media in order to avoid panic and 
distress, and the information should regard confirmed cases and not suspected cases. Correction of 
rumours in the media should be a communication priority as well as identifying population sub-
groups for targeted communication channels.   
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2.11. Travel policies 
78% agreed that “health advice for travellers” is an efficient, an applicable (89%) and politically 
acceptable (76%) intervention in the control of SARS during an outbreak. On the other hand the 
experts agreed, that “ban of all domestic travel” is neither an applicable (75%) nor a cost-effective 
(75%) intervention in the control of SARS. 79% disagreed to  “Ban of all international travel” being 
an efficient intervention to control SARS. 
 
Below is a list of suggestions by the experts when asked which measures they would recommend to 
reduce the risk of introduction of diseases with pandemic potential, like SARS into their countries:      
 
• Health advice to travelers 
• Exclusion of sick persons (fever) from 
travelling 
• Improvement of surveillance capacity 
in home country as well as S.E. Asia 
• Screening of travelers 
• Case history 
• Contact tracing 
• Respiratory hygiene, using of face 
masks and handwashing 
• Reduce travel to affected countries 
• Training of aircraft crew and border 
control services 
• Information to the public 
• Self reporting and quarantaine  
• Border control 
• Quarantine 
• National and international  process 
for horizon scanning. (Identifying new 
and potential threats before they 
become a major public health threat.) 
• Coordinated multiagency task force to 
be utilized 
 
 
2.12. National and international infection control 
National infection control 
Suggestions were made by the panelists on how to improve national disease control of diseases with 
pandemic potential. The panelists suggested improvement of the political cooperation within 
countries. Other suggestions included: further development procedures that allocate resources at 
national level, coordination and support of local governments; development of a better system for 
early detection as well as a better system to continuously monitor the impact of disease and the 
effect of counter measures; improvement of communication strategies and interdisciplinary 
cooperation in pandemic preparedness plans; and enabling national and regional testing of plans and 
structures, as well as ensuring funding for implementation and research. 
 
 
Summary travel policies: 
Health advice for travellers was seen at the only efficient measure in the control of SARS during an 
outbreak. Screening of travellers, contact tracing, information to the public and quarantine were 
some of the measures recommended by the panel to reduce the risk of introducing SARS into their 
country.  
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International disease control: 
Suggestions were also made by the Delphi panelists on how to improve international disease control 
of diseases with pandemic potential. Panelists suggested development of international collaboration 
and common plans, active support of organizations like WHO and ECDC for guidelines and support 
during an outbreak situation. Other suggested that the ECDC should develop guidelines and 
coordinate preparedness activities and emphasis was put on improving communication processes at 
both national and international levels. The panelist were of the opinion that agreements should be 
made between international institutions and involve exchange of communication, aid and findings 
between public health experts and scientists. International health regulations should be operational 
and international institutions should be provided with resources to improve surveillance and control 
in countries that have poor resources but many infections. 
 
Summary national and international infection control: 
Improvement of political collaboration, allocation of national resources to the local levels and 
improvement of surveillance and monitoring systems for early cases were some of the suggestions 
on how to improve national pandemic disease control.  
 
International collaboration on guidelines, support, communication, aid and research were some of 
the suggestions made for the improvement of international diseases control.    
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 3. Results of the Face-to-face Delphi meeting 
 
This section contains a short summary of the main results from the Delphi face-to-face meeting held 
at the Hamburg workshop, Tuesday 30th January 2007 The aim of the Delphi meeting was to gather 
expert opinion on different issues concerning European strategies to prevent and control future 
spread of SARS (and SARS like diseases). The Delphi meeting was the final step in a Policy Delphi 
approach that was preceded by a 2 round written Delphi survey carried out between October 2006 
and January 2007.  
 
The issues selected for discussion at the face-to-face meeting originated from the written Delphi 
survey and addressed the questions/issues that did not reach consensus in the written rounds (non-
consensus was defined as questions having less than 75% consistency in the answers). The selected 
issues were: 
1. National pandemic preparedness plans 
2. Travel policy 
3. Communication 
4. Community containment measures 
 
3.1. National pandemic preparedness plans 
The task of this issue was to argue, how nations can ensure that their plans are operational in an 
outbreak situation. 
The participants agreed that to ensure that the plans are operational, they need to be tested. Testing 
of plans was defined as table top exercises and simulations so that all the participants had a 
common understanding of the term ‘testing’. Testing of plans should be based on certain criteria 
and the frequency should not just be decided as an interval of certain fixed number of years. The 
participants defined some of the criteria for the frequency of testing as follows: 
Testing should be based on: 
- level of threat of SARS 
- the resources that are available / the practicalities associated 
- the lessons learnt from previous exercises 
- formal updates by organizations (such as ECDC, WHO) 
- neighbouring country’s approaches and exercises should be coordinated with them. 
 
The participants also discussed the different regional levels of the pandemic preparedness plans 
(local, national, regional, global). According to the participants this should depend on the following: 
- structure of the countries’ health systems 
- demographics 
- political commitment 
- resources 
- coherence of the health system 
- leadership. 
 
According to the participants, development of new mechanisms to learn about gaps and weakness in 
preparedness planning needs to be carefully considered.   
It was also agreed upon that countries should have generic preparedness plans for pandemics, which 
could then be adapted for specific diseases. This would save resources compared to organizing, 
preparing and updating a separate plan for each disease. 
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3.2. Travel policy 
The task was to argue for the efficiency, applicability, political acceptance and cost-effectiveness of 
different travel policy measures to reduce the risk of introducing SARS into the country in case of 
an outbreak. The travel policy measures included: 
- Entry screening of travellers arriving from affected countries (e.g. temperature check) 
- Exit screening of travellers leaving affected countries  
- Ban of all domestic/international travel.  
 
The participants agreed that for SARS none of the above listed travel policy measures were efficient 
and therefore a further discussion of the applicability, political acceptance and cost-effectiveness of 
the measures was seen as irrelevant. The arguments were: 
• Lack of evidence of the efficiency of entry and/or exit screening  
• Ban of all domestic travel might be efficient, but will not be possible to implement due to 
other associated problems 
• Ban of all international travel is against International Health Regulations (IHR) 
• Health advise for travellers was seen as the most efficient travel policy measure to reduce 
the risk of introducing SARS, but it should come from a credible source (e.g. WHO), by 
way of: 
• Information on disease symptoms  
• Information on when, how and where to seek medical care 
 
The participants suggested setting up of 24 hour hotlines for travellers and advice them to seek help 
if necessary. They also were of the opinion that travellers seeking medical care should be allowed to 
access care in another country irrespective of their nationality and insurance as these might delay or 
keep the travellers from reporting themselves sick.  
 
3.3. Communication 
The task of this issue was to identify population sub-groups that should receive targeted 
information in case of a new SARS pandemic outbreak. 
 
As starting point emphasis was put on grouping the population based on their risk of exposure, and 
target them with information specifically relevant for their group. The following 5 groups were 
suggested: 
- Health care personnel 
- Public servants 
- General public 
- Travellers 
- Media  
 
There was also agreement on distributing targeted information in different languages in order to 
accommodate the ethnic minority groups in the countries. Securing early detection of cases also 
imply securing illegal residents with a guarantee not to be deported if they seek medical care. The 
need for facilitators was emphasized as very important in this case.      
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3.4. Community containment measures 
The task was to discuss the efficiency, applicability, political acceptance and cost-effectiveness of 
different community containment measures like: 
- Voluntary and mandatory home quarantine 
- Closure of educational establishments and business 
- Ban of mass gatherings  
- Use of face masks by everyone in the public. 
 
None of the measures listed above were seen as efficient for SARS as the majority of the population 
in question will not benefit from them. Quarantine (defined as staying at home and being restricted 
from physical contact without using personal protection equipment and where only the family can 
go out), voluntary as well as mandatory, is not efficient as SARS becomes infectious only after the 
infected person develops symptoms, and symptomatic persons will be isolated for further 
treatment/observation. Also closures of educational establishments and businesses as well as ban of 
mass gatherings were seen as non efficient for reducing the spread of SARS. However, informing 
the community about necessary precautions when going out etc. was perceived as much more 
important and efficient. Use of facemask by everyone in the public was not perceived as efficient, 
whereas use of facemask by health care workers attending to SARS patients was rated very useful, 
despite it being uncomfortable and only bearable for shorter periods of time (max 5 hours).  
 
There is a need for common definitions of important terms like “voluntary/mandatory quarantine” 
as it appears that these terms are defined differently within different countries. There is also a need 
for an EU- strategy for reporting research results for common good (early case detection) in case of 
an outbreak. Funding to secure availability of such research capacity is necessary.  
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4. Conclusion of the Delphi survey 
 
In the present section we will briefly highlight the most important points of both the written and the 
face-to-face Delphi. Finally we will give a brief statement of the extended round 2 survey results, 
which include the seven responses received AFTER the face-to-face Delphi (n=35).      
 
Written Delphi 
The importance of pandemic preparedness planning and the need to ensure that plans are developed 
in close collaboration with relevant stakeholders is advocated by the WHO (WHO, global influenza 
preparedness plan, 2005). In the recent years a considerable amount of planning and development 
and publication of national preparedness plans in most EU member states has taken place. The need 
for operational Pandemic Preparedness Plans (PPP) on both local and national level was agreed 
upon by the Delphi panelists as well as the need to test plans on a local, national as well as 
transnational level. Countries should be informed of the pandemic plans of their direct neighbours 
in order to enable collaboration on outbreak strategies concerning e.g. travel and health care. 
Experts also recommend the need for having table top exercises and stimulations between countries 
to enable smooth functioning of plans during pandemics. The time interval for testing PPP was 
between ½-3 years for local and national plans, and 12 priority groups were listed, for which 
countries should have a plan to identify them. Furthermore, it was agreed that in order to reduce 
confusion and misunderstandings during a pandemic, roles and responsibility of the national and 
local/regional levels need to be clearly defined in the national PPP and the development of local and 
regional plans need to monitored by the national level. 
 
Surveillance measures play a key role in fast containment of communicable disease outbreaks. In 
order to ensure an effective surveillance of infectious diseases with pandemic potential, a vast 
amount of information is required for the identification of infection source and transmission routes.  
 
Anticipated needs of laboratory supplies and staffing are necessary to enable prioritization of cases 
during the different pandemic phases, as the demand for e.g. testing will increase significantly 
during an outbreak situation and might result in resource shortage in later stages of the pandemic if 
not addressed in the plan from the beginning. 
 
Triage policies during a pandemic outbreak are critical strategies for patient classification and 
management leading to reduction of mortality. If triage policies are not well organized there is a 
possibility that the triage system will collapse during a pandemic due to the amount of people 
seeking medical service. National pandemic preparedness plans must include a detailed triage plan 
including mechanisms such as telephone hotlines, special care centres etc. to detect and classify 
patients. However the plan needs to be flexible as details depend on the specific type of pandemic at 
hand.  
 
Pandemic outbreaks have a massive impact on health care systems as they will be confronted with 
different challenges such as e.g. scarcity of facilities, human resources, supplies and management 
capacities which needs to be accounted for in the pre-pandemic period. Also the need for plans on 
the maintenance of other essential services, such as e.g. food/water/gas/electricity/police/fire 
brigade during a pandemic has to be acknowledged and worked upon in the pre-pandemic period to 
best manage a future outbreak e.g. by way of cooperation between the different service authorities.   
   
Traditionally non-medical interventions have been widely used in pandemic outbreaks and shown to 
be effective in dealing with them. Contact tracing and use of facemasks by healthcare workers were 
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seen as efficient, applicable, politically acceptable and cost-effective interventions to control a 
SARS outbreak.   
                   
Communication strategies play an important role during outbreaks, since it is essential to fast and 
safely send and receive important information between e.g. international organizations, the 
governments, healthcare institutions, workers and the general public. There should be no delay in 
announcement of information to the media in order to avoid panic and distress, and information to 
the public should regard confirmed cases and not suspected cases. Correction of rumours in the 
media should be a communication priority as well as identifying population sub-groups for targeted 
communication channels.   
                    
Health advice for travellers is seen as the only efficient travel-related measure in the control of 
SARS during an outbreak and was also one of the recommended measures listed by the panellists to 
reduce the risk of introducing SARS into the country. Other recommendations were: screening of 
travellers, contact tracing, information to the public and quarantine.  
                  
Improving infection control at the national level involves improvement of political collaboration, 
allocation of national resources to the local levels and improvement of surveillance and monitoring 
systems for early case detection. Suggestions for the improvement of international diseases control 
involved development of guidelines on international collaboration, support, communication, aid and 
research.  
 
Face-to-face Delphi 
The main results of the face-to-face Delphi concerning the non-consensus issues pointed to: a need 
to define criteria for testing pandemic preparedness plans on different regional levels; travel advice 
as the only efficient AND feasible travel policy measure; a need to define priority groups for 
targeted communication, based on their risk of exposure; the need for defining community 
containment measures such as quarantine more clearly as well as; and enabling universal access to 
care in case of an epidemic outbreak. Further strategies mentioned to prevent and control future 
spread of SARS (and SARS like diseases) are public access to existing research results and securing 
research capacity on the EU-level. These measures would improve also transferability of the 
research-based knowledge from SARS to other potential infectious disease outbreaks. 
 
 
4.1. Extended survey (n=35) conclusions                       
Delphi round 2 received 28 questionnaires until the deadline of the second reminder; January 24th 
(response rate of 74%). However, additional 7 questionnaires were received after the deadline and 
were thus not included in the data presented at the Delphi face-to-face meeting in Hamburg, January 
30th nor in the primary dataset, analyzed above.  
 
When including the additional 7 questionnaires, the response rate increased from 74% to 92 %. A 
separate analysis of the extended dataset (n=35) was conducted to see if there was an impact on the 
results. As illustrated in table 1, the new analysis resulted in 4 statements no longer meeting the 
consensus criteria of 75 % consistency in the replies. 
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If the 7 additional questionnaires were received in time the 4 statements in table 1 would have been 
included as non-consensus issues for discussion at the face-to-face Delphi meeting in Hamburg.  
 
However, the first three statements in table 1 were discussed at the face-to-face meeting, as they did 
not reach consensus (dataset n=28) in one or more of the variables asked for each statement 
(efficient, applicable, politically-acceptable and cost-effective) as e.g. (see appendix 4):  
1. Ban of all domestic travel is efficient = 71% disagree,  
2. Ban of all international travel is applicable  = 71% disagree  
The last statement in table 1, on communication, was not discussed at the face-to-face meeting in 
Hamburg specifically as it had reached consensus in the primary survey. However communication 
was one of the central policy aspects of discussion at the Hamburg meeting. Hence there is no 
considerable change in the results of the primary survey when compared to the results of the 
extended survey as these issues were addressed in the face to face meeting despite not being on the 
non-consensus issue list.  
Table 1: Changes from dataset 1 (n=28) to dataset 2 (n=35)   
Statement Response % 
n=28 
Response % 
n=35 
Ban of  all domestic travel is applicable 
 
75 
disagree 
74 
disagree 
Ban of  all domestic travel is cost-
effective 
 
75 
disagree 
74 
disagree 
Ban of all international travel is 
efficient 
 
79 
disagree 
74 
disagree 
Information about suspected or 
probable cases of diseases with 
pandemic potential (e.g. SARS) should 
be confirmed before a public 
announcement 
 
75 
agree 
71 
agree 
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Appendix 1 
Delphi questionnaire 1 (October 2006) 
A Delphi study of the identification of national and international effective and 
acceptable strategies for the control of SARS and SARS-like diseases. 
 
Dear Panellist, 
The present study is part of the EU funded SARSControl project, aiming to identify effective and 
acceptable strategies for the control of SARS and SARS-like diseases in Europe and China. The 
goal of this two-round written Delphi study is to develop recommendations for international disease 
control policies and we kindly ask you, as a member of the Delphi panel, to help us by giving your 
opinion on the different issues addressed on national pandemic policies. The questions are very 
diverse as they are a result of 3 different sources: a HACCP analysis of national and international 
policies for infectious diseases with pandemic potential, research results from other SARSControl 
project partners and review of resent publications on national pandemic plans.  
 
We kindly ask you to review and answer the questions as your country’s national expert or 
international NGO representative, based on your national/international experiences with managing 
diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS, Avian influenza).  
 
Instructions: 
1. Please provide an answer to each statement and make comments on any issue you wish. 
2. If you are not informed about the specific issue in one or more of the below questions, please 
state this in the comments. 
3. We use a 9-point Likert scale for rating the answers; please choose only one score of the 
agreement scale for each question.  
4. The structure of the questionnaire is based on the 3 pandemic periods, defined by the WHO 
(Appendix 1). Please note: For the purpose of this survey, we have changed the original 
definitions slightly by deleting the specification on “influenza” as we are interested in general 
diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS and Avian influenza). Please answer the 
questions according to the different periods, bearing in mind general diseases with pandemic 
potential, unless otherwise specified.  
5. For further information please contact: Lulu Hjarnoe; E-mail: lhjarnoe@health.sdu.dk,     
Phone: +45 6550 4206. Fax +45 6550 4283 
 
 
Personal information 
 
Name:       
 
Country of residence:       
 
Occupation:       
 
Affiliation:       
 
Contact information 
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Phone number:       
 
E-mail:        
 
 
 
National pandemic plans 
The plan was 
last updated 
 
 
Please state if your country has: 
Yes No 
Month Year 
I don’t  
know 
a. an operational national preparedness plan specifically 
for SARS.                
b. an operational national preparedness plan specifically 
for pandemic influenza.                
c. a common pandemic preparedness and response plan for 
diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS and Avian 
influenza). 
               
 Comments:      
 
The inter-pandemic period 
 
1. Surveillance indicators in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement:  
  completely 
disagree 
do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. There is a need for clear guidance on surveillance 
and monitoring of key indicators (e.g. antiviral 
testing and health care response system) in the 
different pandemic phases in order to enable the 
healthcare system to cope during a pandemic period. 
         
b. A joint operational surveillance and outbreak 
procedure for pandemic diseases between health and 
veterinary authorities will enable early detection of 
an emerging new infection 
         
Comments:      
 
2. Laboratory capacities in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Anticipated needs in terms of laboratory supplies 
and staffing should be measured in order to 
enable prioritisation (of cases) for  lab testing 
during the different phases of a pandemic 
         
Comments:      
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3. Triage policy1 in the inter-pandemic period  
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Triage priorities need to be clearly organized to avoid 
inefficiencies in the response to the pandemic along 
with ethical dilemmas; therefore national pandemic 
preparedness plans must include a detailed triage plan 
including mechanisms such as telephone hotlines, 
special care centers etc. to detect and classify patients. 
         
Comments:      
 
4. Roles and responsibilities of the central and regional levels in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements with reference to your country: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. The distribution of roles and responsibilities at 
national and local/regional levels needs to be 
clearly defined in the national pandemic plan 
         
b. There is a need for the national level to monitor 
the development and completion of local and 
regional plans 
         
Comments:      
 
5. Cooperation between direct neighbouring countries in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Countries should to be informed of the pandemic 
plans of direct neighbouring countries, in order to 
enable collaboration in case of an outbreak (e.g. 
travel restrictions, clinical care and health service 
plans) 
         
Comments:      
 
                                                 
1Triage is a system used by medical or emergency personnel to ration limited medical resources when the number of 
injured needing care exceeds the resources available to perform care so as to treat the greatest number of patients 
possible.  
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6. Testing of national pandemic plans in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
    completely disagree do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. It is necessary to test national and local 
pandemic plans in order to put them into 
practice 
         
b. Please indicate the time interval relevant for testing the plans:                           Every    0    years 
Comments:      
 
7. Antiviral drugs in the inter-pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements with reference to your country: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. There is a need to prioritise groups that should 
receive antiviral drugs          
b. Countries should have a plan on how to 
distribute and monitor the administration of 
antiviral drugs. 
         
c. Stockpiling of antiviral drugs should cover the following percentage of your country’s 
population. 
0% 
Comments:      
 
The pandemic alert period 
 
8. Antiviral drugs in the pandemic alert period  
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to 
the whole population          
b. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to 
healthcare workers           
c. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to 
other priority groups2            
Comments:      
 
 
                                                 
2
 By “priority groups” we refer to e.g. key national decision makers, people with certain illnesses/occupation, people 
within certain age groups etc.     
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9. Vaccine strategies in the pandemic alert period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. The whole population should be vaccinated  
with pre-pandemic vaccine*          
b. Only children should be vaccinated with pre-
pandemic vaccine*           
c. Priority groups2 should be vaccinated with pre-
pandemic *          
d. The demand for pre-pandemic vaccine supply* 
needs to be met by a plan of production or 
procurement 
         
* Presumably lower efficacy, as not optimised to pandemic strain 
Comments:      
 
The pandemic period 
 
10. Vaccine strategies in the pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements:  
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. The whole population should be vaccinated 
after the first wave**          
b. Children only should be vaccinated after 
the first wave **          
c. Priority groups should be vaccinated after 
first wave**          
** well matched vaccine to pandemic strain  
Comments:      
 
11. Antiviral drugs in the pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Antiviral treatment should be given to all 
cases (suspected and probable)          
b. Antiviral treatment should be given to 
serious cases (e.g. hospitalised)          
c. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to the 
whole population          
d. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to 
healthcare workers          
Comments:     
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12. Impact on health care system in the pandemic period 
a.  During an epidemic the health care systems will be confronted with different challenges (such as 
shortage of human resources, infection control methods, scarcity of health care facilities). Please list up 
to 5 challenges relevant for your country.  
 1.       
 2.       
 3.       
 4.         
 5.       
Comments:       
 
13. Maintenance of essential services in the pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. Plans for the maintenance of essential services 
(e.g. supply of food, transportation, 
communication etc.) during a pandemic are 
needed  
         
Please list sectors you find are relevant in your country to be involved in preparing for the maintenance of 
essential services during an outbreak: 
1)       
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
  6)      
  7)      
  8)      
  9)      
10)      
Comments:       
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14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period. Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political 
acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a SARS outbreak.  
Efficient Applicable Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Contact tracing 
                                    
Home quarantine 
voluntary                                     
Mandatory home 
quarantine                                     
Closure of 
educational 
establishments 
                                    
Closure of 
businesses                                     
Ban of mass 
gatherings                                     
Screening of 
travelers arriving 
from affected 
countries 
                                    
Screening of 
travelers leaving 
affected countries.  
                                    
Use of face masks 
                                    
Health advice for 
travelers                                     
Ban of all domestic 
travel                                     
Ban of all 
international travel                                     
Comments:      
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15. Non-medical public health interventions in an influenza pandemic period. Scenario: 25-30 confirmed influenza cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political 
acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control avian influenza.  
Efficient Applicable Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
Do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Contact tracing 
                                    
Home quarantine 
voluntary                                     
Mandatory home 
quarantine                                     
Closure of 
educational 
establishments 
                                    
Closure of 
businesses                                     
Ban of mass 
gatherings                                     
Screening of 
travelers arriving 
from affected 
countries 
                                    
Screening of 
travelers leaving 
affected countries  
                                    
Use of face masks 
                                    
Health advice for 
travelers                                     
Ban of all 
domestic travel                                     
Ban of all 
international 
travel 
                                    
Comments:      
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16. Communication in the pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
  completely 
disagree 
do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. In the interest of transparency, information about 
suspected or probable cases of diseases with pandemic 
potential should be made public as soon as the authorities 
are aware of them, rather than waiting for them to be 
confirmed. 
         
b. During the pandemic period it is better to delay 
announcement of information in order to avoid public 
panic and distress 
         
c. Correcting rumors and inaccurate information in the media 
or in the public should be a communication priority during 
an epidemic 
         
d. There is a need to identify population sub-groups and 
provide targeted communication channels specific for 
these groups in the pandemic period  
         
Comments:     
 
17. Travel policy in the pandemic period 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
 Border control measures at international airport(s) 
of destination are an effective strategy: 
completely 
disagree 
do not 
agree/nor 
disagree 
completely 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a. to reduce the risk of introduction of SARS          
b. to reduce the risk of introduction of avian influenza          
  
 Based on your experience, which measures would you recommend to reduce the risk of introduction of 
diseases with pandemic potential, like SARS and Avian influenza into your country? 
 SARS Avian influenza 
1       1       
2       2       
3       3       
4       4       
 
 
c. 
5       5       
Comments:      
 
18. National and international infection control 
Please give suggestions for improving your country’s national infection control of diseases with pandemic 
potential:  
      
 
 
Please give suggestions for improving international disease control, regarding diseases with pandemic potential: 
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Thank you very much for completing this part of the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Pandemic periods   
 
Inter-pandemic period: 
Phase 1: There have been no new virus subtypes detected in humans that would signal the conditions 
required for a pandemic. Based on past evidence, the viruses detected in animals are considered to be 
of low risk to humans. 
 
Phase 2: There have been no new virus subtypes detected in humans. However, a circulating animal 
virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. This assessment is based on various factors, 
such as past history of a similar strain causing serious illness in humans and the extent of the outbreaks 
in animals. 
 
Pandemic alert period 
Phase 3: A new virus subtype is detected in humans. There may be rare instances of an infected 
individual spreading the virus to other individuals they have been in close contact with, but in general 
there is no evidence of the virus spreading easily among humans. 
 
Phase 4: Small clusters of human-to-human spread of the virus are reported. But outbreaks are 
localized, which suggests that the virus does not spread easily to and among humans. 
 
Phase 5: One or more larger clusters are reported, but human-to-human spread is still localized, which 
suggests that the virus is becoming increasingly capable of infecting humans but may not be 
fully transmissible (there is a substantial pandemic risk). 
 
Pandemic period 
Phase 6: The virus is easily transmitted to and among humans, resulting in increased and sustained 
spread of the virus in the general population. 
 
Please save the questionnaire and send it back by e-mail or post to:  
 
Aura Timen (lci@rivm.nl )  
Centre for Infectious Disease Control 
Po Box 1 (postbak 13) 
3720 BA Bilthoven 
The Netherlands 
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Appendix 2:  
Delphi questionnaire 2 (December 2006) 
 
Round 2: 
A Delphi study of the identification of nationally and internationally effective and 
acceptable strategies for the control of SARS and SARS-like diseases. 
 
Dear Panelist, 
We kindly invite you as member of the Delphi panel, to participate in the second and final round of our 
written Delphi questionnaire study. The results of our first interview round will be presented to you in this 
questionnaire. Questions which received a high degree of agreement (75% consistency in the answers) in 
the first interview round will not be asked again (they are, instead, presented as the consensus results in 
appendix 1). The distributions and summaries of the answers to the questions, which did not reach 
consensus, will be presented in the current questionnaire (ROUND 1 FEEDBACK), followed by the new 
or/and modified questions (ROUND 2), based on the comments of the panelists.  
 
For this second Delphi round we would like you to fill in the questionnaire again as a national expert or 
international NGO representative. Please answer the questions based on your experiences with managing 
diseases with pandemic potential (like SARS and pandemic influenza).  
We are very grateful for your participation in the Delphi Panel and your contribution to the SARSControl 
project. Your opinion will support the development of policy recommendations for the European 
Commission. The aim of the Delphi study is to develop recommendations for international disease control 
policies for pandemic infection. 
 
Thank your very much for your participation! 
 
 
Instructions: 
6. Please provide an answer to each statement and make comments on any issue you wish. 
7. If you are not informed about the specific issue in one or more of the questions below, please state 
this in the comments. 
8. We use a 9-point Likert scale for rating the answers; please choose only one score of the agreement 
scale for each question.  
9. The structure of the questionnaire is based on the 3 pandemic periods, defined by the WHO 
(Appendix 1). Please note: For the purpose of this survey, we have changed the original definitions 
slightly by deleting the specification on “influenza” as we are interested in both SARS and 
pandemic influenza. Please answer the questions according to the different periods and specified 
disease e.g. SARS or/and pandemic influenza.   
10. For further information please contact: Lulu Hjarnoe; E-mail: lhjarnoe@health.sdu.dk,     
Phone: +45 6550 4206. Fax +45 6550 4283 
Background information 
 
Name:       
 
Country of residence:       
 
Occupation:       
 
Affiliation:       
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Contact information 
Phone number:       
 
E-mail:        
 
Testing of pandemic preparedness plans  
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
6. Testing of national pandemic plans in the inter-pandemic   
period. 
1st Delphi round response in % 
Every 0 ½ 1 2 3-5 5-9 year Questions nr. 6b (1st Delphi round) did not reach consensus: 
“Please indicate the time interval relevant for testing national 
and local pandemic preparedness plans in the inter-pandemic 
period” 
 19 5 43 11 11 11  
Summary of the round 1 comments  
A majority of the Delphi panel agreed (92%) on the necessity of testing national and local plans in order 
to put them into practice, however, opinions differed on the time interval for testing. Several panelists 
indicated this should be decided based on the disease and level of threat. Panelists also suggested a more 
frequent testing of local plans compared to national plans.   
ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have modified the question and added additional questions. 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements and fill in the frequency (every 
X years): 
During an inter-pandemic period, please indicate 
the time interval relevant for testing: 
SARS Pandemic Influenza   
1a. 
National pandemic preparedness plans  Every  0 years  Every  0  years  
1b. Local pandemic preparedness plans Every  0 years  Every  0 years 
Completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
 
During an inter-pandemic period: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1c. Plans should be tested based on disease and level of 
threat          
1d. Local plans should be tested more frequently than 
national plans          
1e. There is a need for joint exercises between 
neighboring countries          
Comments:      
 
 
Antiviral Drugs (AD) in the inter-pandemic period   
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
7. Antiviral Drugs in the inter-pandemic period. Response in % 
0% -20% -30% -40% -75% Missing Question 7c (1st Delphi round) did not reach consensus  
“Stockpiling of AD should cover the following 
percentage of your country’s population: 
 
21 
 
24 
 
38 
 
11 
 
3 
 
3 
Summary of the round 1 comments  
81% of the Delphi panel agreed on the need to prioritize groups that should receive AD in an inter-pandemic period 
as well as the need for countries to have a plan on how to distribute and monitor the administration of AD (95%). 
There were different opinions on the preferred size of stockpiling, and knowledge of specific disease and financial 
capacity of the country were stated as important factors for stockpiling.  
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ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have modified the question and added an additional question. 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements and fill in the percentage: 
2a. Stockpiling of AD for pandemic influenza should cover the following percentage of your 
country’s population. 
0% 
 
Completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
Completely 
agree 
  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2b. Countries should have a plan to describe the process 
by which individuals belonging to priority groups will 
be identified 
         
Comments:      
 
Antiviral Drugs (AD) in the pandemic alert period   
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
8. Antiviral drugs in the pandemic alert period Response in % 
Question 8b and 8c did not reach consensus:  1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
8b. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to healthcare workers 24 30 38 8 
8c. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to other priority groups3   27 30 35 8 
Summary of the round 1 comments  
Expert comments indicated the lack of need for antiviral prophylaxis in the pandemic alert period and in case of 
use, it would be for treatment only. Comments also suggested the need for disease specification. 
ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have modified the questions and added additional questions. 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
Completely 
 disagree 
do not agree/ 
 nor disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3a. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to priority 
groups in a SARS pandemic alert period?           
3b. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to priority 
groups in an Influenza pandemic alert period?            
3c. Antiviral prophylaxis should only be used as treatment 
in case of an Influenza pandemic alert period?          
4c. Antiviral prophylaxis is not relevant in the pandemic 
alert period?            
Comments:      
 
Antiviral Drugs (AD) in the pandemic period   
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
11. Antiviral drugs in the pandemic period Response in % 
Question 11a, 11c and 11d did not reach consensus:  1-3 4-6 7-9 M 
11a. Antiviral treatment should be given to all cases (suspected and 
probable) 
 
19 
 
19 
 
49 
 
13 
11c. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to the whole population 70 19 3 8 
11d. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to healthcare workers 11 27 51 11 
Summary of the round 1 comments  
                                                 
3
 By “priority groups” we refer to e.g. key national decision makers, people with certain illnesses/occupation, people within 
certain age groups etc.     
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A majority of the Delphi expert panel (81%) agreed on giving antiviral treatment to serious cases (e.g. 
hospitalised). Comments again indicated the need for knowledge on specific disease, epidemiology of the pandemic 
in question and availability of antiviral prophylaxis.  
ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have modified the questions. 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statement and give the list of the preferred priority 
groups: 
Completely 
 disagree 
do not agree/ 
 nor disagree 
Completely 
agree 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4a. Antiviral prophylaxis in the SARS pandemic period 
should only be given to health care workers at risk of 
exposure. 
         
4b. Please list groups of people that in your opinion should be prioritized for antiviral prophylaxis in 
the SARS pandemic period:  
1)       
2)       
3)       
4)        
5)       
Comments:        
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ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period. Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political 
acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a SARS outbreak. 
Please see below schedule for “Round 1” responses (gray columns).  
Summary of the round 1 comments: 
A majority agreed on ‘contact tracing’ being both efficient (81%) and applicable (89%). ‘Health advice for travelers’ was agreed upon to be an efficient (78%), applicable 
(89%) as well as a politically acceptable SARS control intervention. 
ROUND 2 
Based on comments from the Delphi panel we have modified the questions (in red). The scenario is several confirmed SARS cases in the community.  
5. Round 1: 
Efficient 
Round 2:  
Efficient 
Round 1:  
Applicable 
Round 2:  
Applicable 
  
Response in %   
completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
completely 
agree 
 
Response in % 
completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
completely 
agree 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9 
Home quarantine 
voluntary 11 24 54 11          8 27 51 14         
Mandatory home 
quarantine 14 19 57 11          19 27 46 8         
Closure of educational 
establishments 22 35 27 16          14 16 59 11         
Closure of businesses 32 41 11 16          46 22 19 13         
Ban of mass 
gatherings 11 32 43 14          11 16 62 11         
Screening of travelers 
arriving from affected 
countries 
19 30 38 13          16 30 43 11         
Screening of travelers 
leaving affected 
countries.  
11 22 51 16          19 19 49 13         
Use of face masks  14 24 38 24 Please see below question 14 27 40 19 Please see below question 
Use of face masks by 
Healthcare workers New question          New question         
Use of face masks by 
everyone in the public New question          New question         
Ban of all domestic 
travel 62 19 3 16          68 19 0 13         
Ban of all international 49 24 11 16          68 19 0 13         
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travel 
 
 Round 1  
Politically acceptable 
Round 2: 
Politically acceptable 
Round 1  
Cost-effective  
Round 2  
Cost-effective 
 Response in %   completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
completely 
agree 
 
Response in % 
completely 
disagree 
do not agree/ 
nor disagree 
completely 
agree 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9 
Home quarantine 
voluntary 6 24 62 8          8 35 41 16          
Mandatory home 
quarantine 16 32 43 8          11 30 40 19          
Closure of educational 
establishments 8 35 41 16          38 24 22 16          
Closure of businesses 49 21 11 19          51 16 14 19          
Ban of mass 
gatherings 14 30 40 16          19 32 32 16          
Screening of travelers 
arriving from affected 
countries 
11 22 54 13          30 30 24 16          
Screening of travelers 
leaving affected 
countries.  
3 27 57 13          22 30 32 16          
Use of face masks  6 24 51 19 Please see below question 14 30 32 24 Please see below question 
Use of face masks by 
Healthcare workers 
New question 
         
New question 
         
Use of face masks by 
everyone in the public 
New question 
         
New question 
         
Health advice for 
travelers Consensus was reached (appendix 1) 5 19 62 14          
Ban of all domestic 
travel 65 22 0 13          65 11 3 21          
Ban of all international 
travel 62 24 0 14          65 14 3 19          
Comments:        
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Communication  
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
16. Communication in the pandemic period Response in % 
Question 16a did not reach consensus:  1-3 4-6 7-9 Missin
g 
In the interest of transparency, information about suspected or probable cases 
of diseases with pandemic potential should be made public as soon as the 
authorities are aware of them, rather than waiting for them to be confirmed. 
27 8 65 0 
Summary of the round 1 comments  
The majority of the Delphi expert panel disagreed with the statement that it is better to delay announcement of 
information in order to avoid public panic and distress. 89% agreed on correcting rumors and inaccurate 
information in the media or in the public. The panel agreed that there is a need to identify population sub-
groups for targeted communication in the pandemic period. 
ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have modified the question. Please state to what extent you agree with the 
following statement and list the preferred populations subgroups: 
Completely 
 disagree 
do not 
agree/ 
 nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
6a
. 
Information about suspected or probable cases of diseases 
with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS) should be confirmed 
before a public announcement. 
         
6b
. 
Please identify population sub-groups you find should receive targeted information in case of a new 
SARS pandemic outbreak: 
1)       
2)       
3)       
4)       
5)       
Comments:        
 
Travel policy   
ROUND 1 FEEDBACK 
17. Travel policy in the pandemic period. Response in % 
Question 17 did not reach consensus:  1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
Border control measures at international airport(s) of destination are 
an effective strategy to reduce the risk of introduction of SARS 
30 24 46 0 
Summary of the round 1 comments  
Various measures to reduce introduction of SARS were listed. Health advice for travellers was listed by most.   
ROUND 2   
Based on the comments we have decided to ask the same question again as well as adding additional questions. 
Please state to what extent you agree with the following statements 
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Completely 
 disagree 
do not 
agree/ 
 nor 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
7a. 
 
 
Border control measures at international airport(s) of 
destination (entry screening) are an effective strategy 
to reduce the risk of introduction of SARS 
         
7b. Temperature measurement of passengers departing 
from affected countries (exit screening) is an 
effective strategy to avoid international spread of 
SARS. 
         
7c. Ban of flights from affected areas/countries is an 
effective strategy to avoid international spread of 
SARS. 
         
Comments:        
 
Appendix 1: 
 
Feedback report of Delphi round 1 consensus questions 
Please find below the questions which received the highest degree of agreement by the Delphi panel 
(minimum of 75% consistency in the answers) in the first interview round.  
 
 
Response in % 
 National pandemic plans 
Please state if your country has: Yes No Don’t 
know 
Missing 
a. an operational national preparedness plan specifically for SARS. 54 38 8 0 
b. an operational national preparedness plan specifically for pandemic 
influenza. 95 3 3 0 
c. a common pandemic preparedness and response plan for diseases with 
pandemic potential (e.g. SARS and Avian influenza). 32 46 11 11 
 
 
Response in % 1. Surveillance indicators in the inter-pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a There is a need for clear guidance on surveillance and monitoring of 
key indicators (e.g. antiviral testing and health care response system) in 
the different pandemic phases in order to enable the healthcare system 
to cope during a pandemic period. 
0 10 87 0 
b. A joint operational surveillance and outbreak procedure for pandemic 
diseases between health and veterinary authorities will enable early 
detection of an emerging new infection 
5 8 87 0 
 
 
Response in % 2. Laboratory capacities in the inter-pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. Anticipated needs in terms of laboratory supplies and staffing should 
be measured in order to enable prioritisation (of cases) for  lab testing 
during the different phases of a pandemic 
0 5 95 0 
SARSControl project/WP8/L Hjarnø, AM Syed, AR Aro, SDU 
 
 40 
 
 
Response in % 3. Triage policy§ in the inter-pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. Anticipated needs in terms of laboratory supplies and staffing should 
be measured in order to enable prioritisation (of cases) for  lab testing 
during the different phases of a pandemic 
0 8 89 3 
 
 
Response in % 4 Roles and responsibilities of the central and regional levels in 
the inter-pandemic period 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. The distribution of roles and responsibilities at national and 
local/regional levels needs to be clearly defined in the national 
pandemic plan 
0 3 97 
 
0 
 
b There is a need for the national level to monitor the development and 
completion of local and regional plans 0 11 87 3 
 
 
 
 
Response in % 5 Cooperation between direct neighbouring countries in the 
inter-pandemic period 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. Countries should to be informed of the pandemic plans of direct 
neighbouring countries, in order to enable collaboration in case of an 
outbreak (e.g. travel restrictions, clinical care and health service 
plans) 
0 14 84 3 
 
 
 
Response in % 6 Testing of national pandemic plans in the inter-pandemic 
period 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. It is necessary to test national and local pandemic plans in order to 
put them into practice 0 5 92 0 
 
 
 
Response in % 7 Antiviral drugs in the inter-pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. There is a need to prioritise groups that should receive antiviral 
drugs 8 5 96 5 
b Countries should have a plan on how to distribute and monitor the 
administration of antiviral drugs. 0 0 95 5 
 
 
 
                                                 
§Triage is a system used by medical or emergency personnel to ration limited medical resources when the number of 
injured needing care exceeds the resources available to perform care so as to treat the greatest number of patients 
possible.  
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Response in % 8 Antiviral drugs in the pandemic alert period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. Antiviral prophylaxis should be given to the whole population 78 14 0 8 
 
 
 
Response in % 11 Antiviral drugs in the pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
b. Antiviral treatment should be given to serious cases (e.g. 
hospitalised) 3 5 81 11 
 
 
 
Response in % 13 Maintenance of essential services in the pandemic period 
1-3 4-6 7-9 Missing 
a. Plans for the maintenance of essential services (e.g. supply of 
food, transportation, communication etc.) during a pandemic are 
needed 
0 3 95 3 
 
 
 14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period. Scenario: 25-30 
confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in % Response in %   Response in % Response in % 
 Efficient Applicable Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 
Contact 
tracing 0 8 81 11 0 5 89 5 0 8 87 5 0 10 76 14 
Health 
advice for 
travelers 
0 8 78 14 0 0 89 11 No consensus 
 
15. Non-medical public health interventions in an influenza pandemic period. Scenario: 25-30 
confirmed influenza cases reported in the country.  
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control 
pandemic influenza. 
 Response in % Response in %   Response in % Response in % 
 Efficient Applicable Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 1-3 4-6 7-
9 
M 1-3 4-6 7-9 M 
Health 
advice for 
travelers 
3 0 78 14 8 3 76 14 No consensus 
 
 
 
16 Communication in the pandemic period Response in % 
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 1-3 4-6 7-9 Missin
g 
b. During the pandemic period it is better to delay announcement of 
information in order to avoid public panic and distress 81 8 10 0 
c. Correcting rumors and inaccurate information in the media or in 
the public should be a communication priority during an epidemic 5 5 89 0 
d. There is a need to identify population sub-groups and provide 
targeted communication channels specific for these groups in the 
pandemic period 
5 16 78 0 
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Appendix 3 
Statistical feedback of the consensus results of Delphi round 1 (n=38) & 2 (n=28)  
 
1. Pandemic preparedness plans 
Round 1 
Response in % 
 National pandemic plans 
Please state if your country has: Yes No Don’t 
know 
Missing 
a. an operational national preparedness plan specifically for 
SARS. 54 38 8 0 
b. an operational national preparedness plan specifically for 
pandemic influenza. 95 3 3 0 
c. a common pandemic preparedness and response plan for 
diseases with pandemic potential (e.g. SARS and Avian 
influenza). 
32 46 11 11 
 
 
Testing of national pandemic plans 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 16 68 
a. It is necessary to test 
national and local 
pandemic plans in order to 
out them into practice 
Total
**
 
0 5 95 
3 
 
Round 2 
 
During the inter-pandemic period: 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 4 0 4 29 36 29 
c. 
Plans should be tested 
based on disease and level 
of threat 
Total* 0 7 93 
0 
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 7 0 7 0 29 39 17 
e. 
There is a need for joint 
exercises between 
neighboring countries Total* 7 7 86 
0 
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 4 0 25 32 39 
e. 
Countries should have a plan 
to describe the process by 
which individuals belonging 
to priority groups will be 
Total* 0 4 96 
0 
                                                 
**
  Sum of scores within each agreement bracket: Completely disagree (1-3), Nor agree/nor disagree (4-6), 
 Completely agree (7-9). 
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identified 
 
Round 2 
Response in % During an inter-pandemic SARS 
period, please indicate the time interval 
relevant for testing pandemic 
preparedness plans: 
 
Every 
0 ½ 1 2 3 4 5  
Year 
National pandemic preparedness plans  4 0 25 14 36 4 18 
Local pandemic preparedness plans 
 
11 11 21 21 18 4 14 
 
 
 
During the inter-pandemic period: Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor  
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 4 11 11 7 11  29 21 4 
a. Local plans should be tested more 
frequently than national plans 
Total* 25 18 54 
4 
 
 
Surveillance indicators 
Round 1 
 
Surveillance indicators in the inter-pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 3 8 16 24 47 
a There is a need for clear guidance 
on surveillance and monitoring of 
key indicators (e.g. antiviral 
testing and health care response 
system) in the different pandemic 
phases in order to enable the 
healthcare system to cope during 
a pandemic period. 
Total* 0 10 87 
3 
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 3 3 0 0 5 3 13 24 50 b. A joint operational surveillance 
and outbreak procedure for 
pandemic diseases between health 
and veterinary authorities will 
enable early detection of an 
emerging new infection 
Total* 5 8 87 
0 
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Laboratory capacities 
Round 1 
 
Laboratory capacities in the inter-pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 3 0 5 21 26 45 0 
a. Anticipated needs in terms of 
laboratory supplies and staffing 
should be measured in order to 
enable prioritisation (of cases) 
for  lab testing during the 
different phases of a pandemic 
Total* 0 5 95  
 
Triage policy 
Round 1 
 
Triage policy in the inter-pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 3 5 21 29 40 
a. Anticipated needs in terms of 
laboratory supplies and staffing 
should be measured in order to 
enable prioritisation (of cases) for  
lab testing during the different 
phases of a pandemic Total* 0 8 89 
3 
 
Travel Policies  
Round 1& 2 
14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in % 
 Efficient Applicable 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis-
sing 
Health 
advice for 
travelers 
0 0 0 0 5 3 18 26 34 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 26 55 11 
Total 0 8 78  0 0 89  
Ban of  all 
domestic 
travel 
25 32 18 4 0 4 0 0 0 
Total 
Non-consensus  
75 7 0 
18 
Ban of all 
international 
travel 
18 18 
4
3 4 4 4 0 0 0 
Total 79 11 0 
11 Non-consensus 
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14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in %   
 Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis
sing 
Health 
advice for 
travelers 
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18 68 
Total 8 3 76 
13 Non-consensus 
Ban of  all 
domestic 
travel 
25 25 25 0 0 0 4 0 0 
Total 
Non-consensus 
75 0 4 
21 
Ban of all 
international 
travel 
Total 
Non-consensus Non-consensus 
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Round 1 
 
Roles and responsibilities of the central and regional levels in the inter-pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 13 74 0 
a. The distribution of roles and 
responsibilities at national and 
local/regional levels needs to be 
clearly defined in the national 
pandemic plan Total* 0 3 97  
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 3 8 21 18 47 3 b There is a need for the national 
level to monitor the 
development and completion of 
local and regional plans 
Total* 0 11 87  
 
Cooperation between direct neighbouring countries 
Round 1 
 
Cooperation between direct neighbouring countries in the inter-pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor  
disagree Completely Agree     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 3 13 11 21 50 
a. Countries should to be 
informed of the pandemic plans 
of direct neighbouring 
countries, in order to enable 
collaboration in case of an Total* 0 14 84 
3 
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outbreak (e.g. travel 
restrictions, clinical care and 
health service plans) 
 
Maintenance of essential services 
Round 1 
 
 
Maintenance of essential services in the pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 24 61 
a. Plans for the maintenance of 
essential services (e.g. supply of 
food, transportation, 
communication etc.) during a 
pandemic are needed  
Total* 
 
0 
 
 
 
3 
 
95 3 
 
Communication 
Round 1 
 
Communication in the pandemic period 
Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 40 13 26 3 5 3 8 3 0 
b
. 
During the pandemic period it is 
better to delay announcement of 
information in order to avoid 
public panic and distress 
Total* 81 8 10 
0 
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 3 0 3 0 5 0 21 18 50 
c. 
Correcting rumors and 
inaccurate information in the 
media or in the public should be 
a communication priority during 
an epidemic 
Total* 5 5 89 
0 
Response in % 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 3 0 3 0 13 5 16 26 34 d
. 
There is a need to identify 
population sub-groups and 
provide targeted communication 
channels specific for these 
groups in the pandemic period 
Total* 5 16 78 
0 
 
Round  2 
 
Communication in the 
pandemic period Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree Completely Agree     
a. Information about suspected 
or probable cases of diseases 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
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 4 0 11 0 7 0 40 18 18 with pandemic potential (e.g. 
SARS) should be confirmed 
before a public 
announcement 
Total* 14 7 75 
4 
 
Non-medical Public health interventions: 
Round 2 
14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in % 
 Efficient Applicable 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis-
sing 
Contact tracing   0 0 0 0 5 3 21 13 47 0 0 0 0 5 0 32 24 34 
Total 0 8 81 11 0 5 89 5 
Home quarantine 
voluntary  4 0 4 4 7 0 29 25 18 4 0 4 4 4 7 32 21 11 
Total 7 11 71 
11 
7 14 64 
14 
Home quarantine 
mandatory 0 4 7 0 7 0 39 21 11 4 21 4 11 11 4 21 14 7 
Total 10 7 71 
11 
21 11 53 
14 
Closure of 
educational 
establishments 
7 4 25 4 7 11 21 7 4 0 0 4 0 7 14 39 11 11 
Total 35 21 32 
11 
4 21 61 
14 
Closure of 
businesses 11 4 36 7 21 4 0 0 0 4 14 43 7 7 4 4 0 0 
Total 50 32 0 
18 
61 18 4 
18 
Ban of mass 
gatherings 0 4 18 4 14 4 21 18 7 0 0 4 0 7 7 36 18 11 
Total 21 21 46 
11 
4 14 64 
18 
Use of face masks  
by everyone on the 
public 
18 11 29 4 11 11 11 0 7 11 18 21 4 18 4 11 4 0 
Total 57 25 18 
11 
50 25 14 
11 
Use of face masks 
by Healthcare 
workers 
0 0 4 0 0 0 29 36 32 0 0 4 0 0 0 21 43 25 
Total 4 0 96 
0 
4 0 89 
7 
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Round 2 
14. Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in %   
 Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis-
sing 
Contact tracing   0 0 0 0 5 3 24 29 34 0 0 0 0 5 5 29 13 34 
Total 0 8 87 5 0 10 76 14 
Home quarantine 
voluntary  0 4 0 0 11 4 25 29 7 0 4 0 0 11 7 32 11 14 
Total 4 14 60 
21 
3 18 57 
21 
Home quarantine 
mandatory 0 0 14 0 11 7 29 18 4 0 4 11 0 4 4 43 4 11 
Total 4 14 61 
21 
14 7 57 
21 
Closure of 
educational 
establishments 
0 4 4 4 14 0 39 18  7 7 18 0 11 7 14 11 4 
Total 7 18 57 
18 
32 18 29 
21 
Closure of 
businesses 7 29 32 4 0 0 11 0 0 14 21 29 4 4 0 7 0 0 
Total 68 4 11 
18 
65 7 7 
21 
Ban of mass 
gatherings 0 4 4 0 4 4 46 21  7 4 4 4 7 4 36 14 0 
Total 7 7 68 
18 
14 14 50 
21 
Use of face masks  
by everyone on the 
public 
7 0 18 7 11 7 32 11 0 18 7 36 4 4 7 4 7 0 
Total 25 25 43 
7 
61 14 11 
11 
Use of face masks 
by Healthcare 
workers 
0 0 0 0 0 0 25 21 46 0 0 4 0 0 7 18 29 32 
Total 0 0 92 
7 
4 7 78 
11 
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Appendix 4 
Statistical feedback of the non- consensus results  
of Delphi round 1 & 2 
 
 
Pandemic preparedness plans 
 
During the inter-
pandemic period: Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor agree/nor 
disagree Completely Agree     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 4 11 11 7 11  29 21 4 
a. Local plans should be 
tested more frequently 
than national plans 
Total* 25 18 54 
4 
 
 
Travel policy 
 
Travel policy in the 
SARS pandemic 
period 
 
Response in % 
 
Completely disagree Nor agree/nor disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 11 11 32 7 0 4 18 4 7 
a. Border control 
measures at 
international 
airport(s) of 
destination (entry 
screening) are an 
effective strategy to 
reduce the risk of 
introduction of SARS 
Total* 54 11 28 
7 
 
Completely disagree Nor agree/nor disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 7 4 21 0 7 21 25 4 4 
b. Temperature 
measurement of 
passengers departing 
from affected 
countries (exit 
screening) is an 
effective strategy to 
avoid international 
spread of SARS. 
Total* 32 29 32 
7 
 
Completely disagree Nor agree/nor disagree Completely Agree     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Missing 
 11 7 46 4 0 11 11 4 0 
c. Ban of flights from 
affected 
areas/countries is an 
effective strategy to 
avoid international 
spread of SARS. Total* 65 14 14 
7 
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Communication  
 
Communication in the 
pandemic period Response in % 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 
 11 3 13 3 5 0 34 13 18 0 
a
. 
In the interest of 
transparency, information 
about suspected or 
probable cases of diseases 
with pandemic potential 
should be made public as 
soon as the authorities are 
aware of them, rather then 
waiting for them to be 
confirmed.  
Total* 26 8 66  
 
Non-medical Public health interventions 
Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in % 
 Efficient Applicable 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis
-
sing 
Screening of 
travelers 
arriving from 
affected 
countries 
7 4 29 0 7 4 21 4 14 4 0 21 4 11 4 21 14 7 
Total 39 11 39 
11 
25 18 43 
14 
Screening of 
travelers 
leaving from 
affected 
countries 
0 7 14 4 0 7 43 7 7 0 4 11 4 4 11 36 14 7 
Total 21 11 57 
11 
14 18 57 
11 
Ban of  all 
domestic 
travel 
18 25 29 4 0 11 0 4 0 
Total 71 14 3 
11 Consensus 
Ban of all 
international 
travel 
25 29 18 7 0 0 4 0 0 
Total 
Consensus 
71 7 4 
18 
Home 
quarantine 
voluntary  
4 0 4 4 7 0 29 
2
5 18 4 0 4 4 4 7 
3
2 21 11 
Total 7 11 71 
11 
7 14 64 
14 
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Home 
quarantine 
mandatory 
0 4 7 0 7 0 39 
2
1 11 4 
2
1 4 
1
1 
1
1 4 
2
1 14 7 
Total 10 7 71 
11 
21 11 53 
14 
Closure of 
educational 
establishmen
ts 
7 4 25 4 7 
1
1 
2
1 7 4 0 0 4 0 7 
1
4 
3
9 11 11 
Total 35 21 32 
11 
4 21 61 
14 
Closure of 
businesses 11 4 
3
6 7 21 4 0 0 0 4 
1
4 
4
3 7 7 4 4 0 0 
Total 50 32 0 
18 
61 18 4 
18 
Ban of mass 
gatherings 0 4 
1
8 4 14 4 
2
1 
1
8 7 0 0 4 0 7 7 
3
6 18 11 
Total 21 21 46 
11 
4 14 64 
18 
Use of face 
masks  by 
everyone on 
the public 
18 11 
2
9 4 11 
1
1 
1
1 0 7 
1
1 
1
8 
2
1 4 
1
8 4 
1
1 4 0 
Total 57 25 18 
11 
50 25 14 
11 
 
 
 
Non-medical public health interventions in a SARS pandemic period.  
Scenario: 25-30 confirmed SARS cases reported in the country. 
With reference to your country, please indicate to what extent you agree with the non-medical interventions 
listed below in terms of efficiency, applicability, political acceptability and cost-effectiveness to control a 
SARS outbreak. 
 Response in %   
 Politically acceptable Cost-effective 
 Completely 
disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
Completel
y disagree 
Nor 
agree/nor 
disagree 
Completely 
Agree     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mis-sing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mis-
sing 
Screening of 
travelers 
arriving from 
affected 
countries 
0 0 11 0 7 0 43 4 18 11 11 14 11 4 7 7 14 0 
Total 11 7 64 
18 
36 21 21 
21 
Screening of 
travelers 
leaving from 
affected 
countries 
0 4 4 4 0 0 61 4 7 11 7 7 7 4 14 18 11 0 
Total 7 4 71 
18 
25 25 29 
21 
Health advice 
for travelers 3 3 0 3 3 13 11 18 34 
Total 
Consensus 
7 36 43 
57 
Ban of  all 
domestic 
travel 
21 14 36 4 4 0 4 0 0 
Total 71 7 4 
18 Consensus 
Ban of all 
international 
travel 
14 21 32 0 11 4 0 0 0 18 25 18 29 0 4 4 0 0 0 21 
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Total 67 14 0 71 7 0 
Home 
quarantine 
voluntary  
0 4 0 0 11 4 25 29 7 0 4 0 0 
1
1 7 
3
2 11 14 
Total 4 14 60 
21 
3 18 57 
21 
Home 
quarantine 
mandatory 
0 0 14 0 11 7 29 18 4 21 0 4 11 0 4 4 
4
3 4 11 
Total 4 14 61  14 7 57 
21 
Closure of 
educational 
establishment
s 
0 4 4 4 14 0 39 18 0 18 7 7 18 0 
1
1 7 
1
4 11 4 
Total 7 18 57  32 18 29 
21 
Closure of 
businesses 7 
2
9 32 4 0 0 11 0 0 18 
1
4 
2
1 
2
9 4 4 0 7 0 0 
Total 68 4 11  65 7 7 
21 
Ban of mass 
gatherings 0 4 4 0 4 4 46 21 0 18 7 4 4 4 7 4 
3
6 14 0 
Total 7 7 68  14 14 50 
21 
Use of face 
masks  by 
everyone on 
the public 
7 0 18 7 11 7 32 11 0 7 
1
8 7 
3
6 4 4 7 4 7 0 
Total 25 25 43  61 14 11 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
